



The controls over alien property that have been utilized during this war are
two: one is the freezing control exercised by the Treasury; the other is the Alien
Property Custodian's power to supervise and to vest. The Freezing Control has
been in effect since April io, 1940, the day following the invasion of Norway and
Denmark. It was inaugurated by Executive Order 8389 issued pursuant to Sec. 5b
of the Trading with the Enemy Act. The Custodian's authority derives from
Executive Order 9095 of March 11, 1942, as amended by Executive Order 9193 of
July 6, 1942, also resting on the Trading with the Enemy Act.
POWERS OF CONGRESS AND T-E PRESIDENT
Basic to federal regulation of this sort is the constitutional question: Does the
regulation fall within the powers of Congress and the President? Affirmative answer
as to both controls seems dear. Executive Order 8389, as amended, establishing
the Freezing Control, forbids certain transactions (unless licensed) if those trans-
actions, roughly, involve the property of foreign nationals or are by, for or in the
interest of those nationals; the transactions forbidden are movements in bank cred-
its, bank payments, foreign exchange, bullion and currency, and (perhaps the broad-
est of all) dealings in evidences of indebtedness or evidences of ownership of property
by any person within the United States. Analogous freezing of such transactions,
except the one last mentioned, under that same 5(b) which, though amended fre-
quently, has been in existence since 1917, had been upheld in the Gold Clause cases
even in peace-time.' The powers of Congress to regulate transactions in and affect-
ing money and currency; 2 the powers of Congress over transactions affecting inter-
state and foreign commerce, even if the primary aim be something other than the
protection of that commerce and even if the regulation is not incidental to some
other federal sphere of activity;' the extent of federal power in respect of foreign
or external affairs, said to be inherent in sovereignty and not dependent on affirm-
*A.B., 1921, St. Louis University; LL.B., 1925, Harvard University; Member of the Missouri Bar;
Special Assistant to the Attorney General and Chief, Alien Property Unit, War Division, Department of
Justice, May, 1942 to September, 1944.
'Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 294 U. S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317
(x935); Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330 (1935). 2Ibid.
I United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (194). And see, as to federal control of instrumentalities
of credit and exchange in interstate transactions; United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199, 204 (919).
S.E.C. v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315, 320 (S. D. N. Y. 1936), reversed on other grounds, 87 F. (2d) 446
(C. C. A. 2d, 1937); Wright v. S.E.C., 112 F (2d) 89, 94 (C C. A. 2d, 1940).
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ative grants of the Constitution;4 finally, the war powers of Congress and the Presi-
dent--one or more of these powers are adequate bases for the freezing control
(leaving out for the moment questions of due process, etc.). Similarly there can be
little doubt that the Alien Property Custodian's supervision and vesting, even if
vesting includes confiscation, falls within an area over which federal power extends'
-just what can be done under that power being another question. Moreover, the
Freezing Control and the Custodian's authority both rest upon Executive Orders
of the President and hence can find support in the war powers and extensive for-
eign affairs powers that pertain to that office.'
DELEGATION TO THE PRESIDENT
It is unnecessary to discuss at length constitutional questions concerning presi-
dential exercise of improperly delegated legislative powers under the Trading with
the Enemy Act. Even if (as the writer does not intend to imply) Sec. 5 (b) of the
Act, as it stood when the President first inaugurated the freezing control, could
have been said to lack proper standards relative to declaration of emergencies or
the designation of specific foreign countries or to lack both standards and statutory
authorit for Executive definition of terms like "national" (broadly defined in
Executive Order 8389, as amended) ,7 both the Joint Resolution of Congress of
May 7, 194o,8 and the First War Powers Act0 expressly ratified the presidential
orders and the departmental rulings and regulations thereunder. Not only did this
Congressional action set at rest any question of unguided delegation as to any trans-
action thereafter arising' ° but may have validated prior administrative actions," as
for as the Freezing Control is concerned.
As to the Custodian's powers, similar conclusions can be reached in favor of the
delegated powers, although no administrative background existed, in this war, with
reference to supervision and vesting before the 194o and 1941 amendments of 5 (b).
For one thing, the same guiding principles approved by Congress for freezing con-
trols would seem applicable. Also, the provision in 5 (b) that vested property should
be held used, etc., "in the interest and for the benefit of the United States" would
seem to supply an adequate standard." Moreover, the new "vesting" provision of
'United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
' Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943), also a "freezing" case in a sense: restricting
movement of the person.
'Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch iso (U. S. 1814); Miller v. United States, Ii Wall. 268 (U. S.
1870); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239 (1921); United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 5 F. (2d)
x91 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925), modified 272 U. S. 1 (1926).
'United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (936); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U. S. 81 (1943); United States v. Von Clemm, 136 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
" See infra p. 137.
854 STAT. I79 (1940).
955 STAT. 840 (941) 5o U. S. C. App. (943 Supp.) §§616, 617.
10Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 8i (1943); United States v. Von Clemm, 136 F. (2d)
968 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
" Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297 (1937).
"' Cf. Currin v. Wallace, 3o6 U. S. 1 (1939); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 (1939); Nat. Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (943).
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5 (b) is no more lacking in standards than was the old (and still retained) "seizure"
provision of Section 7(c), under which World War I seizures were upheld."b
Moreover, there is always the possibility that the above mentioned Executive
Orders can stand on the President's war powers and his powers over foreign affairs"
wholly aside from any question of delegation to him.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Questions of spheres of federal power and of delegation aside, there is still the
problem of due process. The procedural due process to which a person is entitled
where factual determinations are sought to be established against him will be dis-
cussed later. The other facet of due process-substantive due process-raises the
question of the reasonableness of the regulatory measures. In plain language the
problem can be stated: Does the measure in question go too far? The far reaching
nature of the controls is noticeable at several points: The broad definition of "na-
tional" of a foreign country, the wide category of transactions that are frozen and
the possibly drastic meaning of "vesting" of the property of foreign nationals.
Freezing of the Property of a "National" of a Foreign Country
The concept of "national" of a foreign country (as distinguished from "enemy,"
"ally of enemy," etc., in the original text of the Trading with the Enemy Act),
newly introduced by the Executive Orders under consideration, is broadly defined
to include:
(i) Any person who has been domiciled in, or a subject, citizen or resident of a foreign
country at any time on or since the effective date of this Order.
(ii) Any partnership, association, corporation or other organization, organized under the
laws of, or which on or since the effective date of this Order had or has had its principal
place of business in such foreign country, or which on or since such effective date was
or has been controlled by, or a substantial part of the stock, shares, bonds, debentures,
notes, drafts, or other securities or obligations of which, was or has been owned or con-
trolled by, directly or indirectly, such foreign country and/or one or more nationals
thereof as herein defined.
(iii) Any person to the extent that such person is, or has been, since such effective date,
acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly for the benefit or on behalf of any
national of such foreign country, and
(iv) Any other person who there is reasonable cause to believe is a "national" as herein
defined.
Without pausing to consider the significance of certain other related provisions,
such as who shall determine who is a "national," one readily sees that the foregoing
general licenses issued by the Treasury and by the possibility of specific licensing in
any particular case. Of course there is a question whether a citizen or friend can
be regulated even to the extent of having to seek a license. The answer would seem
"bStoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239 (xq2i); United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 5 F. (2d)
t9g (C. C. A. 3 d, 1925), modified 272 U. S. 1 (1926). "2 See cases cited supra footnote 7.
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to depend, under accepted due process approach, on whether there is any rational
basis for a reasonable belief in the need for the regulation as a means to achieve
appropriate ends sought by the Control.12  One obvious end is to prevent any trans-
action which might give aid, material or moral, to the enemy. This end would
seem to justify, for instance, freezing regulations calculated to prevent the enemy
from cashing in on foreign-owned American-held assets by sales to speculators dis-
counting post-war values. Limitations of space make it impossible to discuss the
validity of the freezing controls in the infinite number of situations that might be
presented; by way of illustration, the above reasoning would clearly uphold the posi-
tion, early taken by the Treasury Department in its General Ruling No. 2,'1 that
the freezing control prohibits, except under license, the transfer by banking institu-
tions within the United States of stock certificates from or into the names of "na-
tionals" of Norway or Denmark. Short of arbitrary or capricious action in
administration, it is difficult to perceive violation of due process under the freezing
regulations, whatever might be the case as to destruction or confiscation of property.
Due process allows for a margin of error on the side of the conceived public wel-
fare,' 4 particularly in wartimer
It is significant that of the attacks in the courts upon the Freezing Control, two
cases were voluntarily dismissed; 6 the others have resulted favorably to the Govern-
ment. One case upheld the conviction of an American citizen making unlicensed
payment for diamonds imported from a blocked country.' 7  Another case18 absolved
an employer of liability for breach of a contract of employment, both parties being
"nationals"'0 of a foreign country, where the contract had been terminated at the
instance of the Treasury Department.20 Two cases have denied an injunction to a
2a .. . . regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a char-
acter as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis .. " Mr. Justice Stone, in
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 150 (1938). A fortiori it would seem, as to
national defense measures. Moreover, the court, in passing upon legislation, is not called upon, as arc
the other branches of the government, "to determine what, in its judgement, is the most suitable re-
striction to be applied of those that are possible, or to choose that one which in its opinion is best
adapted to all the diverse interests affected." Mr. Justice Stone, in South Carolina Hwy. Dept. v. Barn-
well Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 19o (1938). " Cone FED. REGs. SuPP. (1940) 4381.
"4 Cf. Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264 (1920), upholding, a provision of a statute that defined
intoxicating liquor as including beverages that contained even one-half of one percent alcohol.
1" Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 8i (1943).
" McLaughlin v. Morgenthau (D. C. S. D. Cal.); Aickelin v. General Aniline & Film Corp. (S. Ct.
N. J., Union County). Not reported.
"
7 United States v. Von Clemm, 136 F. (2d) 968 (C. C. A. zd, 1943).
" Alexewicz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 181 Misc. 181, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 713 (Sup. Ct. Broome
County, 1943).
1" The court, after observing that the employer was a "national" of a foreign country, as dcfined,
said that the employee was also a "national," since as employee he was acting in behalf of a "national."
This particular holding was not necessary to the decision and is questionable in that it ignores the possible
effect of the limiting words "to the extent that" contained in paragraph (iv) of the definition of a
"national." See supra p. 137.
" The court reasoned that the termination of this contract was a condition that the Treasury Depart-
ment could impose on the continued operation of the employer's business. Despite certain broad lan-
guage, the court did not probably mean to intimate that any condition could be imposed. Cf. United
States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U. S. 377 (940); United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. (1936);
Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583 (1926).
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designated "national" seeking to prevent the defendant bank from interfering with
his withdrawal of funds immobilized under the Freezing Control.2 '
Moreover, unconstitutionality of a regulative scheme is not to be determined by
a demonstration that the statutory and administrative provisions are broad enough
to permit, in some conceivable hypothetical situations, unconstitutional results.
Rather, constitutionality is to be tested with respect to the particular application of
the measure to the challenger 22
Supervisory Powers
The statutory authority for the supervisory powers delegated to the Alien Prop-
erty Custodian is precisely the same as that from which the Freezing Control stems.
23
Constitutional questions about these powers, consequently, would seem to turn upon
the same considerations as in the case of the freezing power (except that the super-
visory powers are hardly related to Congress's authority over currency). Indeed
the Alexewicz case24 upheld supervisory action taken by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury (at a time when all powers under 5 (b) were delegated to him) and later adopted
by the Custodian. Like the freezing power, the Custodian's supervisory powers
even as applied to non-enemies probably are not subject to the just compensation
requirement of the Fifth Amendment for the reason that their exercise does not
amount to a taking of property.
The Vesting Power
The vesting power is conferred by that part of 5 (b) (i) (B) which immediately
follows the provisions from which flow the Treasury's Freezing Control authority
and the Custodian's supervisory powers. The pertinent language is as follows:
". .. and any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof shall
vest, when, as, and upon the terms, directed by the President, in such agency or person
as may be designated from time to time by the President, and upon such terms and con-
ditions as the President may prescribe such interest or property shall be held, used, ad-
ministered, liquidated, sold or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit
of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and all acts
incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes...."
At the threshold of any constitutional discussion lies the question of what is
meant by "vest" as used in the statute. Even if it means the most extreme of meas-
ures, i.e., confiscation without payment (now or ever), that probably does not, of
itself, constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law so far as enemies
are concerned. At least that is undoubtedly the tenor of an unbroken line of Supreme
"* Hartmann v. Fed. Res. Bank of Phil., 55 F. Supp. 8oi (E. D. Pa. 1944) ; Carbone Corp. v. First
National Bank, 130 N. J. Eq. 111, 21 A. (2d) 366 (194).
2 Authority need hardly be cited for this familiar proposition. One recent application of this is to
be found in the OPA case, Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944); an interesting application is
to be found in Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 61o (i9s5).
"Section 5(b)(s)(B) of the Trading with the Enemy Act as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. (Supp
III, s941-1943) §616.
" Supra footnote x8.
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Court decisions,25 although strenuous efforts have been made to show that the cases
do not necessarily so holdV6 From what has already been said, in the discussion of
the Freezing Control, the vesting provision of 5 (b) would not be unconstitutional in
toto, even if it were held unconstitutional as to "nationals" that are non-enemies,
Certainly an eiemy could not complain because the statute might be invalid as to a
"non-enemy. '27
Still pursuing this analysis, if 5(b) had provided that the property of a "national"
of a foreign country should be confiscated, seized, used, sequestrated, disposed of or
held in trust, it would not be unconstitutional in toto. On the contrary, probably all
of the authorized treatments would be constitutional as to some nationals, and some
would be constitutional as to any national. And it might be argued that the term
"vest" is broadly used in the statute so as to embrace these various ways of treating
property of "nationals."
However, no different result would follow if "vesting" be construed, as the writer
thinks it must, to connote a transfer of title rather than as permitting the above
extreme flexibility of control.27 The legal consequences that flow from a taking of
title by the United States in the exercise of its war powers are not necessarily rigid.
As to some classes of "nationals" such a taking might (and constitutionally) mean
confiscation without payment; as to others, it might constitutionally require a differ-
ent consequence. It might, for instance, require the payment of just compensation.
The point is, the validity of the title taken (or the validity of a subsequent sale by
the Alien Property Custodian) is to be distinguished from the property owner's rights,
if any, against the United States. The question of tide may be concluded by the
vesting, irrespective of what such other rights may be. In other words, it does
not follow either that all takings must be confiscatory or that no takings can be
confiscatory.
This position is at variance with the analysis formulated by John Foster Dulles, 8
of the New York Bar, who concludes that since it could not have been the intent of
" Cummings v. Deutsche Bank und Disconto Gesellschaft, 3oo U. S. xx5 (1937); Hcnkcls v. Suthcr-
land, 271 U. S. 298 (1926); Miller v. United States, ii Wall. 268 (U. S. 1870); Brown v. United States,
8 Cranch. xio (U. S. 1814); United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 5 F. (2d) 191 (C. C. A. 3d,
1925), modified, 272 U. S. I (1926).
"See Littauer, Confiscation of the Property of Technical Enemies (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 739, 757-8,
where even the Cummings case (see preceding footnote) is apparently analyzed to mean no more than
that alien enemies can be divested of every right so far as may be necessary "for the purpose of retain-
ing part of the enemy property as security for American claims." Small comfort would seem derivable
from this qualification in this war.
" Cf. cases cited supra footnote 22.
""h The term "vest" ordinarily connotes a transfer of title. This usual meaning is buttressed here by
legislative history which plainly shows that the powers conferred on the President to use, administer,
liquidate, sell or otherwise deal with vested property "in the interest of and for. the benefit of the
United States" were not granted for conservatory purposes. Mere conservatory powers might not serve
the interests of the United States, and the Congressional debates show Congress was intent not upon
safe-guarding the interests of the persons whose property was to be vested, but the interests of the
United States in using such property. They show Congress intended that the property might be com-
pletely expended if the President or his delegate deemed that would serve the war effort of the country.
87 CONG. REc. (Part 9, 77th Cong., ist Sess., Dec. 16, i94i, House), pp. 9856, 9861, 9862, 9866.
" Dulles, The Vesting Powers of the Alien Property Custodian (1943) 28 CORN. L. Q. 245.
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Congress to make 5 (b) either a condemnation statute or a confiscation statute (be-
cause it applies in war and peace, to enemy and non-enemy) it must be merely a
regulatory measure. This would make "vesting" a sort of conservation receivership
or trusteeship, although coupled, in view of the specific language of 5 (b), with power
to hold, use, administer, liquidate or sell, just as often is the case with other holders
of non-beneficial tide. One difficulty with the above "regulation" analysis is that it
assumes that vesting must mean only one of three possibilities: condemnation, con-
fiscation or regulation. The writer, on the other hand, conceives of "vesting" as a
generic term that can include them all.
Another difficulty with the theory that the vesting power is simply a facet of a
purely regulatory statute is that the legislative history of Tide III of the First War
Powers Act, 1941, considered as a whole, hardly supports it. If there is anything that
is plain from the legislative history, it is that Congress, ii days after Pearl Harbor,
intended to authorize the use of every power our government constitutionally pos-
sessed to wage total war, economic as well as military."9 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has construed the old Trading with the Enemy Act as a confiscatory statute,
stemming from the constitutional provision empowering Congress "to declare war
... and make rules concerning captures on land and water. 30
In view of the situation that confronted Congress when it enacted the First War
Powers Act, and in view of the Congressional debates on the measure, it seems clear
that Congress did not intend to withhold from the President a power given him dur-
ing the last war and consistently held to be constitutional,3 namely, the power to
confiscate the property of enemies and of those aiding the enemy's cause.
The case of alien friends, it is true, presents a different situation. It must be pre-
sumed that Congress intended to act constitutionally when it authorized the vesting
of their property. The Russian Volunteer Fleet case holds that taking the property
of alien friends without compensation would be unconstitutional 2 However, the
court that decided that case did not have before it the situation that confronted this
nation when the First War Powers Act of 1941 was enacted. One consideration
militating against construing 5(b) as in part a condemnation statute is that the assur-
ance of eventual payment to alien friends might permit the Axis invaders, by tech-
niques of duress, to effectuate sale of American-held assets during the war in return
for crucially needed foreign exchange, thus enabling the enemy to cash in on assets
of coerced persons in occupied nations. Consequently it is possible that due process,
which does not require the best solution of a difficulty, 3 would not foreclose seizure
" (941) SEN. REP. No. 911, 77th Cong., ast Sess., p. 2. See (1941) H. R. Rep. No. 1507, 7 7 th
Cong., ist Sess. (941) for a substantially similar statement on the part of the House Committee. See
also 87 CONG. REC., 980I, 9828, 9855 tO 9868, 9893 to 9895, 9946, 9947.
=o Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239, 241 (192).
8 See cases cited supra footnote 25.
"'Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481 (1931). In the case of nationals of some
countries it would also be a violation of our treaties.
88 Cf. South Carolina Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177 (1938).
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without a right to compensation if Congress eventually took some reasonable action
for the protection of friendly aliensO4
In any event, even if citizens and alien friends must, at the least, be afforded a
right to just compensation for the "vesting" of their property, it does not follow that
merely regulatory powers were conferred upon the Custodian. There is no inherent
reason why Section 5 (b) cannot operate in part as a condemnation act. If, in order
to avoid unconstitutionality implication be raised"0 that compensation is intended
with respect to the property of alien friends, this is sufficient, despite the silence of
the statute, to maintain suit under the Tucker Act37 against the United States."8
The same argument would hold with regard to other persons who are "nationals"
but not enemies, including American citizens whose property was vested by mistake
where a return does not make them whole (although it might be argued that mis-
taken vestings are tortious actions for which the Tucker Act provides no remedy).
The argument does not hold for enemies; there is no reason to believe that ix days
after Pearl Harbor, Congress was squeamish about taking enemy property or that it
intended that the American taxpayer bear the burden of compensation.
The effort to construe 5 (b) as not authorizing confiscation, even of enemy prop-
erty, seems to stem from the notion that confiscation is abhorrent to present day inter-
national law and should be unconstitutional3 This view has never been accepted
by the courts in this country40 and the concepts of Grotius and Rousseau do not fit
present-day war. War has again become total almost in the same degree as when
savage tribes annihilated and enslaved one another. The theory that war is ex-
clusively the concern of the Prince and his professional soldiers and that the citizens
of the state are to be isolated from its rigors, is as inapplicable to Japan and Ger-
many as it was to the horde of Genghis Khan. The "regulation" theory would
create the great practical disadvantage, as Dulles points out, that the property would
immediately revert upon the expiration of the present emergency (unless, of course,
Congress did something about it in the meantime).
PROCEDURAL DuE PRocEss
Besides the question of the degree of property invasion that can be visited upon
enemies or other "nationals," there are certain constitutional requirements em-
bodied in the concept of "due process" regarding the procedure for establishing
"' For example, due process might be satisfied by eventual payment of compensation to the govern-
ment of the national in question, leaving that government to settle the score with the claimant.
"Cf. Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U. S. 74 (1935); Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co.,
309 U. S. z8 (1940); Hamburg American Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 138 (1928); Portsmouth
Harbor L. & H. Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327 (1922); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13
(1933).
ST36 STAT. i136 (1911), 28 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) §250.
"Jacobs v. United States, supra footnote 36; Phelps v. United States, 274 U. S. 341 (x927); United
States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316 (1917).
" Dulles, supra footnote 28; Turlington, Vesting Orders Under the First War Powers Act, Z941
(1942) 36 Am. I. INT. L. 460; BENTwicH, THE LAw oF PRiVATE PROPERTY I WAR (1906) ; BORCHARtD,
DILOM oATC PRorECToN OF CItizENs ASROAD (1915).
' Cases cited stepra footnote 25.
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the fact that a person is an enemy or other "national." If the crucial fact can be
tried in court, procedural due process difficulties largely disappear, assuming, of
course, that proper procedure is otherwise observed in the court action. This is not
to say that the constitutional difficulties are otherwise insuperable, to be discussed
later.
This brings up an interesting problem as to 5(b) vestings. In December, 1941,
after Pearl Harbor, by Title III of the First War Powers Act, Congress adopted a
new Section 5 (b) to go into the old Trading with the Enemy Act. Conceivably,
this new Section 5(b) could be viewed as if it were a separate autonomous statute
all by itself with its own sanctions, etc. On the other hand, it could be viewed as
simply another section tying in with and to be synthesized with the rest of .the Act.
The significance is this: The Act still retains old Section 9(a); by that section any
person not an enemy or ally of enemy (old World War I words of art) claiming
an interest in property seized by "the Alien Property Custodian" may institute suit
in the federal courts to establish his interest and obtain appropriate relief. If that
remedy extends to 5(b) vestings, the day in court that 9(a) gives obviates a major
procedural due process difficulty. The trouble is that the literal language of 9(a)
would permit anybody not an enemy or ally of an enemy to step into court and
recover property even if he is a "national," thereby nullifying the vesting that
5(b) expressly provides for such a "national." One way, however, to avoid this
and still treat 9(a) as affording a judicial remedy for 5(b) vestings is to say that
9(a) must now be construed in the light of the new 5(b) and consequently requires
the claimant to establish, in order to succeed in a 9(a) court action, that he is not
even a 5(b) "national." Indeed this was Judge Bondy's approach in the Draeger
case,4' thus synthesizing 9(a) with 5(b).
The synthesis itself, however, raises certain due process problems as to those
nationals whose property is not constitutionally subject to confiscation. If 9(a)
applies it is the plaintiff's only remedy 2  What will happen if a 9(a) plaintiff
concedes that he is a 5(b) "national" but convinces the court that he is not an enemy
whose property is forfeit? Has he no redress, such as a claim under the Tucker
Act for just compensation? If not, is 5(b) constitutional in its application to him?
It is no answer to say that to date the Custodian has exercised his vesting power
only over the property of true enemies or persons found to have been acting for
them. For example, the property of many persons has been vested on the ground
that they have been "acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly for the benefit
" Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, 49 F. Supp. 215 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). The same result is
reached in Kenji Iki v. Crowley (not reported) and in Hayden et al. v. Crowley (not reported). In
Duisberg v. Crowley, 54 F. Supp. 365 (D. N. J. 1944) the court held it unnecessary to pass upon the
question whether 5(b) has amended 9(a) because it construed the complaint, which alleged that plain-
tiff was a resident American citizen, was the "sole and absolute" owner of the property and that it was
taken from him without "warrant of law," as in effect denying that plaintiff is a national as defined.
"Stern v. Newton, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 593 (1943); The Brennero, 53 F. Supp. 441 (1944); J. C.
Pflueger v. United States, 125 F. (2d) 732 (194r), cert. denied 314 U. S. 617 (x941); Sigg-Fehr v.
White, 285 Fed. 949 (App. D. C. 1923).
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or on behalf of a national" of a designated enemy country. Although the language
of the Miller case is broad,41 it is not certain that every person who is found to have
been acting for the benefit or on behalf of a foreign national to an extent that war-
ranted the vesting of his property will be judicially held to be an enemy subject to
forfeiture.
Again, the definition of "national" (supra page 137) includes a person "who
there is reasonable cause to believe is a 'national' as herein defined." Although in
wartime there is great leeway in preventive measures based on reasonable belief,44
it may be doubted that an American citizen's property can be confiscated on that
basis 5
The questions above posed lead us to reconsider Judge Bondy's analysis. The
difficulty with that analysis is that little support can be found for it in the history
of 5 (b) or in its language or in the legislative debates on Title III of the First War
Powers Act, 1941.
It must be remembered that the vesting power, conferred by the 1941 Amend-
ment, was added to the pre-existing powers to regulate and control coin, bullion,
and currency, transactions in foreign exchange, etc. Neither at the inception of
these powers in 1917 nor at their revival in 1933, nor upon their expansion at the
outbreak of World War II did Congress give any indication that these powers were
subject to review by 9(a) proceedings. Despite the litigation growing out of the
1933 and 1934 amendments4" (the Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 1933 and
the Gold Reserve Act of January 3, 1934) it occurred to no one that a 9(a) remedy
was available.
An examination of the original act and of the history of executive action under
it confirms the thesis that a 9(a) remedy is available only as against actions taken
under Section 7(c). Original Section 6 authorized the appointment of "an Alien
Property Custodian" who was empowered "to receive all money and property in
the United States due or belonging to an enemy or ally of enemy." Section 7(c)
authorized the Custodian to seize such property. Section 9(a) was a procedural
comolement of 7(c), providing a remedy for persons "not an enemy or ally of
enemy" who claimed title to or an interest in money or property seized by the
Alien Property Custodian and held by him or by the Treasurer of the United States.
The terms "enemy" and "ally of enemy" were words of art defined in Section 2.
Furthermore, Sections 6, 12, 24 and others of the 1917 Act provided a complete code
"Miller v. United States, ii Walil. 268 (U. S. 187o). However, the case involved an active resi-
dent of enemy territory using the seized property in active raid of the enemy.
"Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 1 (1943).
"The aggrieved person in the Hirabayashi case, preceding footnote, was a citizen, but this was not
a confiscation case.
"'See e.g., cases cited supra footnote i; Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317 (935); Ucbersee
Finanz-Korporation A. G. v. Rosen, 83 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 2d 1936); Blanchard v. United States,
86 Ct. Cl. 585 (1938); Smith v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 169 (1938); Alaska-Juneau Gold Mining Co.
v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 15 (194); United States v. Campbell, 5 F. Supp. x56 (S. D. N. Y. 1933);
British-American Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 104 F. (2d) 652; xo5 F. (2d)
935 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
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for the administration of property taken over by the Alien Property Custodian,
without coming anywhere near 5 (b).
In the post-war administration of World War I enemy property, the office of
Alien Property Custodian envisaged in Section 6 was eventually abolished and its
functions transferred to the Department of Justice by Executive Order 6694, May I,
1934 7 At the time of the enactment of the First War Powers Act of 1941, the old
Section 6 Alien Property Custodian functions were being exercised by the Attorney
General. After the enactment of the First War Powers Act in 1941, the President
first delegated all 5 (b) powers to the Secretary of the Treasury,48 who shortly there-
after vested, for example, substantially all the stock of General Aniline & Film
Corporation, a Delaware corporation, on the ground that the shares were held by
"nationals of a foreign country." It was not until March ii, 1942, that the President
established, by Executive Order 9o95, in the office for Emergency Management of
the President, "the office of Alien Property Custodian," at the head of which there
was to be "an Alien Property Custodian." In April, 1942, the Department of Jus-
tice functions under the 1917 Act were transferred to the new Alien Prop-
erty Custodian. This transfer, however, was only for the duration of the war and
six months thereafter. On July 6, 1942, a further Executive Order re-distributed
and re-delegated the power of the President under amended 5 (b) to both the Alien
Property Custodian and the Secretary of the Treasury, prescribing the jurisdiction
of each.
Now, it must be emphsized that 9(a) authorizes actions only against the Alien
Property Custodian or the Treasurer, not against other officers 9 It would seem
clear that there is no jurisdiction under 9(a) over a suit against the Secretary of
the Treasury; the same is true of the new World War II "Alien Property Custo-
dian," who merely happens to have the same name as the occupant of the old
World War I office. No "Alien Property Custodian" is referred to in 5 (b) and it
is sheer coincidence that the President used that term to designate the new delegate
of the President's authority. That authority could have been, and at various times
has been, delegated to other officers. 0
The committee reports relative to Title III of the First War Powers Act of 1941 ,1
and the debates on the floor disclosed an intent to confer upon the President, and
to include in 5 (b), authority for a complete and autonomous system of foreign
property control. For one thing, there was doubt as to whether the old Act was
still vital; 2 it was felt that an entirely new measure was desirable. The legislative
"7 Further powers under the Act were delegated to the Department of Justice by ExEc. ORDER No.
8136, May 15, 1939, 4 FED. RFG. 2044 (1939). 48s7 FE.D. REa. 1409 (1942).
"Cf. Von Bruning v. Sutherland, 29 F. (2d) 631 (App. D. C. 1928).
co Including, besides the officers already mentioned, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Farm Security
Administrator, and the Regional Director of the Farm Security Administration for Region IX; 7 FED.
REG. 2713, 2715, 2747 (April 9 and io, 1942).
" See H. R. REP. No. 1507, 7 7 th Cong., Ist Sess. (194) 2-3; SEN. REP. No. 911, 77th Cong., ist
Seas. (1941) 2.
" On December i, 1941, Mr. Summers introduced H. R. 62o6 which would have reenacted all of
the provisions of the original Trading with the Enemy Act "which have for any reason ceased to be
in effect." Senator Reed pointed out: "The Trading with the Enemy Act is today of doubtful validity;
no one knows definitely whether it was repealed by the Knox Resolution." 77 CoNG. REc. 6o (1933).
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history of H. R. 6233, eventually the First War Powers Act of 1941, indicates that
new 5 (b) was to be self-sufficient and unfettered by the rest of the old Act, much
of new 5(b) covering matters already embodied in other sections of the old Act."'
Moreover, 5(b)'s provisions conferring broad powers to investigate, to require the
keeping of books and records and the furnishing of information, to request the
production of and if necessary to order the seizure of books and records, to prescribe
definitions, rules, and regulations-all of these show an intent that 5 (b) should be
self-sufficient.
It is submitted, in view of all these reasons, that 9(a) is not an essential pro-
cedural complement of 5 (b).
Constitutionality of an Autonomous 5(b)
One reason that Judge Bondy was led to synthesize 9(a) and 5 (b) in the Draeger
case54 was that he seemed to have doubts whether an autonomous 5 (b), silent as
to remedies available to a person administratively found to be a "national," would
otherwise be constitutional. 4 It is submitted that these doubts are not well-founded.
For one thing, 5 (b) is not entirely silent; it contains general language which would
seem adequate to authorize the President or his delegate to set up flexible remedial
machinery. The section provides that the President may vest property "when as and
upon the terms directed by him," and further provides that "on such terms and con-
ditions as the President may prescribe, such interests or property shall be held, used,
administered, liquidated, sold or otherwise dealt with in the interest and for the
benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform
all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of such purposes. .. ." As
a matter of fact, both the Secretary of the Treasury"' and the Alien Property Cus-
todian"6 have prescribed rather full regulations setting forth a complete adminis-
trative procedure for persons having claims to property vested or controlled
pursuant to 5(b). Although 5 (b) does not spell out the administrative procedures
set up by the Secretary of the Treasury and by the Alien Property Custodian, this
is not fatal, for the language of the statute would seem broad enough to provide
for such procedures. t
Furthermore, even if the Secretary of the Treasury or Custodian lacked author-
ity to provide administrative remedies, the fact remains that they did so and that
" Thus, 5(b) has an acquittance provision like that in old 7(e); a penalty provision like that in old
16; another provision almost bodily the substance of old 18; power to delegate is found in 5(b) and also
elsewhere. "Supra footnote 41.
4aIn this respect Judge Bondy's position is fortified by a statement in the opinion rcndcrcd in
Standard Oil Company v. Markham, 57 F. Supp. 332 (S. D. N. Y. 1944). In the Standard Oil case
the Government did not raise the question whether 9(a) is available for the return of property vested
under 5(b). The court conse4uently was proceeding on the assumption that 9(a) and 7(c) which makes
9(a) the exclusive remedy, were applicable. Following the World War I cases, the court said: "The
existence of a right upon the part of claimant to regain his wrongfully seized property, and to do so
completely, is essential to the constitutionality of the Act." This is not to say, however, that the right
necessarily could not be secured by an administrative as distinguished from a purely judicial remedy.
"7 FED. REG. 1021 (1942).
"7 FEn. R G. 2290 (1942) 8 FED. REG. 16709 (943).
"Cf. Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax App., 270 U. S. 117 (1926), and the concurring
opinion of Mr. justice Stone in United States v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 291 U. S. 457, 464 (1934)
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the remedies are being widely utilized. True, the Goldman case5" indicates that a
wholly unauthorized administrative procedure need not be exhausted before re-
course may be had to the courts, but in that case, the court found not even an
implied authorization and, besides, the agency involved had not set up any general
regulation for the procedure in question. Indeed, the administrative procedure that
has been set up by the Secretary of the Treasury under 5 (b) (and which is very
similar to that set up by the Custodian) has already been recognized and upheld in
two cases to the extent of invoking the doctrine that a claimant must exhaust those
administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. 9 In any event, it would
seem questionable that the constitutionality of a statute could be successfully chal-
lenged on the ground that the plaintiff had no adequate remedy if in fact he were
provided with one, though gratuitously. It may be that, as the Supreme Court has
recently indicated in another connection, when the issue is one of due process of
law, it is the end result that counts.00
Neither is it an essential condition of the constitutionality of a statute that Con-
gress make detailed provision for judicial review. The courts have always found
ways to review administrative determinations even in the absence of directions from
Congress."' If due process prevents, on the substantive side, confiscation of the
property of some "nationals" in line with the previous discussion, the way seems
open for the determination of claims by procedures that comply with procedural
due process requirements.
PENDING LEGISLATION
There remains to be considered the effect the enactment of pending legislation
would have on the constitutionality of Section 5 (b). A bill for the amendment of
Tide III of the First War Powers Act, 1941, sponsored by the Office of the Alien
Property Custodian and by the Department of Justice, was introduced in the Senate
and the House on May 19, 1944. The Senate Bill was S. 194o and the House Bill
H. R. 4840. The bills were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Sen-
ate and of the House, respectively.
This proposed amendment would in large measure adopt Judge Bondy's syn-
thesis, but at the same time it would obviate the difficulties, referred to above, which
would result from acceptance of the synthesis under existing legislation. The bills
provide that any person claiming an interest in vested property may, after filing a
claim with the Custodian, institute a suit in equity in the appropriate United States
"'Goldman v. American Dealers Service, 135 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
" Cases cited supra footnote i.
"Fed. Power Comm. v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
" American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 (i9o2) (postal fraud order);
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276 (x922) (alien deportation); United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co.
v. Hitchcock, i9o U. S. 316 (903) (determination by the Land Office of the extent of a land grant);
Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329 (932) (imposition of fine by Secretary of
Labor for bringing diseased aliens into the United States); SEN. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess.,
REPORT OF THE AroRNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTErE oN AoMINSmATIVE PRocEDuRE ("Administrative
Procedure in Government Agencies," 1941) 81. See also this Committee's MONOGRAPH No. 13, "Post
Office Department," SEN. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3 d Sess., Part 12, at 7, 38; also, MONOGRAPH No.
15, "War Department," at 4; MONOGRAPH No. 2o, "Department of the Interior," at 46.
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District Court for the recovery of such interest (or the proceeds thereof if it has
been sold prior to the institution of the action), and further provide that the claim-
ant can prevail in such an action only if the court adjudicates that he is not "a foreign
country or national thereof." The bills also make plain the right of a foreign
national who is not an enemy (presumably this would include United States citi-
zens who were "determined" by the Secretary of the Treasury to be foreign
nationals) to sue for just compensation under the Tucker Act.0 2  Like the 1917
Trading with the Enemy Act, the amendment would provide that the relief and
remedy provided therein are exclusive. The bills, if enacted, would seem to lay at
rest any doubts as to the constitutionality of Section 5 (b) insofar as it authorizes the
vesting of property of foreign "nationals." Citizens who can establish that they are
not foreign nationals would be given a remedy, 3 already established as adequate."
Foreign "nationals" who are entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment
(including certain citizens as well as friendly aliens) would be given a remedy for
just compensation. These bills, which do not deal with ultimate disposition of
enemy property and claims, would create no remedies for enemies.
CONCLUSION
Freezing Control and the supervisory authority of the Custodian seem to rest
firmly upon a compendium of the powers of the national government to wage war
and to regulate currency, commerce and the external relations of the nation.
Amendments to the statute have eliminated problems of unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative powers.
. The vesting power, like the freezing and supervisory powers, would seem to be
unfettered by the restrictive provisions of the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act,
including those provisions of Section 9(a) which permit any person not an "enemy"
or "ally of enemy" to recover property conveyed to or seized by the Section 6 Alien
Property Custodian.
Considered as autonomous, the vesting provisions of Section 5 (b) are not uncon-
stitutional as failing to spell out an administrative or judicial remedy. The Act is
an enabling grant of power and its broad terms authorize the establishment of an
administrative procedure, which in fact has been provided and which the courts will
review even in the absence of directions from Congress. This is an adequate rem-
edy for non-foreign nationals whose property has been vested by mistake. The law
will imply a promise to pay just compensation in the case of alien friends and other
non-enemies whose property 5 (b) authorizes the President to vest.
Pending legislation would, if enacted, set at rest any doubts as to the constitu-
tionality of the vesting power conferred by 5(b).
2 Cf. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481 (1931).
"The bills contain elaborate provisions for the treatment of debt claims which are not discussed
herein since there is no constitutional requirement that any relief be accorded to creditors of the former
enemy owners of seized property. See Kogler v. Miller, 288 Fed. 8o6 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1923); and ef.
Miller v. Robertson, 266 U. S. 243, 248 (1924); Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 (1923).
"' Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239 (1921); Kahn v. Garvan, 263 Fed. 909 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
